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Abstract
Purpose – Previous literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting
managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find
that they do influence managers’ behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of
ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.
Design/methodology/approach – In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis
on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness
analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.
Findings – Empirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of
equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation
procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by
investors to be less risky.
Research limitations/implications –
Practical implications –
Social implications –
Originality/value – The authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market
reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only
the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further
promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.
Keywords Code of ethics, Business ethics, Managerial opportunism
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Unethical behaviors by corporate executives - such as frauds, corruption, financial reports
misstatement, improper use of company assets - make public opinion indignant (in the most
striking cases forcing regulators to intervene), harm stakeholders, and destroy shareholders
values. Frauds and corruption pose a tremendous threat to organizations in all parts of the
world. Corporations are estimated to lose about five percent of their revenues to frauds each
year [1]. In the US, the outrage over ethics by executives of public companies led to the
passage of historic legislation in 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (US Congress, 2002),
which redefined, among other things, the role of the code of ethics in business. The legislation
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induced corporations to spend resources on creating a code of ethics that presumably is
implemented to restrict unethical practices and create shareholder values (Orin, 2008).
Prior research documents mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics. The
most comprehensive and recent meta-analysis on the topic is by Kaptein and Schwartz (2008).
The authors examine 79 empirical studies: 35% found that codes are effective; 16% found
that the relationship is weak; 33% found that there is no significant relation, and 14%
presented mixed results. The US’s SOX does not mandate the content or implementation of a
code of ethics: some firms merely adopt generic codes and make less-than-rigorous attempts
to infuse the codes into the firm’s ethical culture. Holder-Web and Cohen (2012) find that some
codes of ethics are copied from industry associations. These codes are generic, vague,
identical to one another, and so-called “off-the-shelf” codes. In contrast, some other firms
adopt codes of ethics that not only satisfy the basic legal requirements but also reflect that
careful thought and attention are consistently paid to the particular ethical conundrums of
our times (Orin, 2008, p. 143).
More recently, Singh et al. (2018) pointed out that many studies have explored the contents
of code of ethics, but few have examined what makes them effective. The relevance of a code
of ethics is because it can enhance corporate reputation and brand image (Singh, 2011).
Despite this, “there is a paucity of research examining the effectiveness of these documents
and the organizational infrastructure that accompany them” (Singh, 2011, p. 385).
We aim to reconcile the mixed findings of the effectiveness of a code of ethics in prior
studies by exploiting the variation in the quality of the code of ethics and by examining its
impact on the cost of equity capital. Building on the model of Bicchieri (2006), we posit that a
code of ethics will activate social norms that restrict opportunistic behaviors and reduce
misconduct. Davidson and Stevens (2013) find that managers of a firm with a more
comprehensive and better-implemented code of ethics gain investor confidence and receive
more reinvestment for their firms. Ahluwalia et al. (2018) show that after the adoption of a
code of ethics, managers become more diligent and engage more in financial scrutiny to cover
past errors in their financial reports. This improvement in investor confidence and the
reduction in misconduct may affect investors’ risk assessment that translates into a lower
cost of equity. In this study, we expect to find firms with a more comprehensive and betterimplemented code of ethics to have a lower cost of equity.
Using a novel dataset of the US S&P 500 firms that capture the quality of a code of ethics
for the period between 2004 and 2012, we examine the relationship between the code quality
and the cost of equity. Consistent with our expectations, empirical results indicate that a
higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms
with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures
pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors as being less risky. This
finding is consistent with the prediction of Bicchieri (2006) model and the findings
documented by Davidson and Stevens (2013) and Ahluwalia et al. (2018).
Like other code of ethics studies, one concern is that the endogeneity between the quality
of a code of ethics and the cost of equity may cause spurious results. To address the issue, we
employ multiple approaches: (1) change regression; (2) additional control variables to the
baseline regression; (3) dynamic panel model using GMM technique to mitigate the issue of
reverse causality; (4) Heckman two-stage regression to mitigate the issue of selection bias;
and (5) difference-in-differences analysis. Overall, our main findings remain robust.
Our study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of a code of ethics in several
ways. We find that not only the adoption but also the implementation of a code of ethics
creates benefits to companies. Due to data limitations, prior studies usually use the adoption
or the existence of a code of ethics to measure corporate business ethics. Our measure of the
quality of a code of ethics is more comprehensive and captures multiple attributes of a code of
ethics: the adoption and comprehensiveness of a code; the compliance of a code via

implementation systems; and the alignment between a firm’s words and deeds of ethical
practices related to human right and corruption issues. Our findings move the literature
forward by showing that the implementation of a code of ethics and the alignment with
ethical practices play a significant role in reducing the cost of equity. This missing key
element – the implementation and the alignment with ethical practices – may be the reason
for mixed findings in the extant literature.
Our study also contributes to practice in two main ways. First, companies may find our
results useful in evaluating whether to invest resources in the implementation of a code of
ethics. The decision about such an investment needs to be as rational as possible, and
companies should weigh the benefits and costs of the implementation. Our work provides
insights on the potential benefits, in terms of lower managerial opportunism.
The second way in which we contribute to practice is by highlighting that how a code of
ethics is implemented does matter. Companies may consider our empirical result in choosing
whether to adopt a more “tick the box” approach to code of ethics or whether to face a
substantial investment that really impacts corporate governance and internal control
systems. Our results show that the second approach is the most rational because it is the only
one that can produce benefits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related
literature on codes of ethics and the cost of equity. Section 3 discusses the theoretical
underpinning of our analysis and develops hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the data sample
and research design. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence, and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Background
2.1 Codes of ethics
Brenner (1992) defines an ethics program as values, policies, and activities driving employee
behaviors. More specifically, he delineates two dimensions of an ethics program: explicit
(such as codes of ethics, policy manuals, employee training materials . . .) and implicit (such as
corporate culture, valued behaviors, style of leadership . . .). Given this broader context, codes
of ethics are the key elements of an ethics program, around which other forms of
institutionalization of ethics evolve (Remisova et al., 2019). We identify two different streams
within the code of ethics literature, based on the conclusions about the effectiveness of a code
of ethics.
The first stream (that we define as the “window dressing” view) finds that a code of ethics
does not provide any benefit to companies implementing it. According to Warren (1993), a
code of ethics provides superficial answers to the question of how to promote ethical
behaviors. Dobel (2015) finds that codes of ethics make stakeholders more suspicious, cynical,
and distrustful. Hess et al. (2005) argue that codes of ethics cost more than they yield. Lere and
Gaumnitz (2003) employ insights from information economics to argue that a code of ethics is
unlikely to have any impact on decision-making. Similarly, Long and Driscoll (2008) find that
codes of ethics are used to gather legitimacy, but they are treated with insincerity by the
organizations that adopt them.
Some studies find no evidence of a relationship between a code of ethics and legal
violations (McKendall et al., 2002). More recently, Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) in their
article eloquently titled “The Cut and Paste Society: Isomorphism in Codes of Ethics”, argue
and find that a code of ethics is simply a response to the ethics-oriented rhetoric in the public
arena and therefore it is unlikely to supply significant useful ethical guidance or constrain
employee behaviors. Adelstein and Clegg (2016) criticize codes of ethics for being
instrumental to risk management and for denying legitimacy to employee moral intuition.
The second stream of research (that we define as the “opportunism constraining” view)
finds that a code of ethics is an effective tool to improve organizations’ commitment and
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decision-making activity. Valentine and Barnett (2003) report that managers employed by
companies with a code of ethics exhibit greater commitment. Similarly, Somers (2001) finds
that accountants’ commitment was higher in companies with a code of ethics than the
commitment in those companies that did not have such a code.
Several studies find that codes of ethics shape and support decision-making (Brass et al.,
1998; Schwartz, 2001). In particular, Pierce and Henry (1996), and Peterson (2002) find that the
presence of a formal code has an impact on individual ethical decisions, and reduces illegality
within corporations. McKinney et al. (2010), in their study of codes and ethical beliefs, show
that businesspersons in organizations that have ethics codes are not likely to accept ethically
questionable behaviors. Valentine et al. (2018) document that codes of ethics impact the
ethical reasoning of employees. According to Ruiz et al. (2015), a formal code of ethics is the
most common concrete organizational instrument to facilitate ethical reasoning and conduct.
The US public companies are not mandated to adopt a formal code of ethics until the
passage of the SOX (US Congress, 2002) with Section 406 code of ethics. Effective on March 3,
2003, all public companies that fall under the SOX regulation of the SEC must meet the
requirements of Section 406. Compliance with Section 406 means that the company must
disclose whether it has adopted a code of ethics and if not the reasons, therefore. It is worth
noting that Section 406 does not mandate the content or how the code must be implemented.
The legislation induces corporations to spend resources on creating a code of ethics that
presumably is implemented to restrict unethical practices and create shareholder values
(Orin, 2008).
Several studies have examined the impact of a code of ethics on executive behaviors and
financial reports after the passage of Section 406. Chen et al. (2018) find that a code of ethics
deters earnings manipulation. Ahluwalia et al. (2018) investigate the impact of the adoption of
a code of ethics and find that the adoption of a code of ethics improves the integrity of
financial reporting by reducing restatements.
In summary, it is not clear whether a code of ethics is effective or creates benefits for
companies. Prior studies only focus on causes and consequences of the existence, not on the
content comprehensiveness or the implementation procedures of a code of ethics (the quality).
These missing key elements of a code of ethics might be the reasons for the mixed findings in
the extant literature. Little do we know whether and how well a code of ethics is implemented.
Moreover, if a code of ethics is implemented, we do not know whether the implementation
creates any benefits. In this study, we aim to fill in this gap in the literature.
2.2 Cost of equity and its determinants
Firms usually raise capital on the equity market by issuing stocks. The value of stocks on the
market (stock price) reflects the present value of projected future cash flows for shareholders
discounted for risk and time (Gebhardt et al., 2001). Higher risk implies a higher cost of equity
and a lower stock price, ceteris paribus, as investors want to be compensated for the higher risk.
The cost of equity is defined as the expected return on a firm’s stock (Fama and Miller, 1972). In
other words, it is the internal rate of return or the discount rate that the market applies to a
firm’s future cash flows to determine its current market value (El Ghoul et al., 2011).
Conceptually, the cost of equity can be measured as the discount rate that equates the
expected future cash flows to the current stock price. The drivers of the cost of equity include
the investors’ perception of a firm’s riskiness and future cash flows (Gebhardt et al., 2001; El
Ghoul et al., 2011). A firm with a higher risk and/or lower future cash flows is expected to have
a higher cost of equity.
Prior literature shows that a firm’s cost of equity is impacted by its perceived risk, and
managerial opportunism. Hong and Kacperzyk (2009) argue that firms operating in “sin”
industries (e.g., gambling, tobacco, and guns industries) face substantial litigation risks and
incur significant settlement costs. Equity investors perceive such firms as riskier and require

a higher cost of capital. Kim and Sohn (2013) examine the impact of managerial opportunism
reflected in earnings manipulation on the cost of capital and document that managerial
opportunism exacerbates the information quality of earnings used by outside investors, and
thus the equity investors demand a higher risk premium for these firms.
Previous studies document that equity investors consider the factors that mitigate
managerial opportunism level of a firm and respond by requiring a lower risk premium. El
Ghoul et al. (2011) examine the effect of corporate social responsibility on the cost of equity
capital and find that firms with better CSR scores are perceived as being less risky and receive
a lower cost of equity. Shen and Zhang (2020) examine the relation between CEO inside debt
holdings on the cost of equity capital. Their findings suggest that CEOs inside debt holdings
help to reduce the cost of equity capital because the debt holdings constrain the CEOs from
excessive risk-taking and opportunistic behaviors.
3. Hypothesis development
Managerial opportunism is a central topic in the economics and management literature.
According to Williamson’s (1981) transaction cost theory, the determinants of transaction
costs are frequency, specificity, uncertainty, limited rationality, and opportunistic behavior.
Such opportunistic behavior is attributed to human nature. Agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) also leverages the idea of opportunism in predicting the behavior of
managers (agents). Given information asymmetry and misalignment of interests, managers
will act opportunistically at the expenses of shareholders (principals). Some scholars (see
Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Cespa and Cestone, 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2010) connected the
idea of managerial opportunism and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and proposed that
CSR is an agency problem.
Based on these premises, a vast stream of literature developed on the corporate
governance mechanisms that may reduce managerial opportunism. Virtually all the
literature on corporate governance is at least partially aiming at reducing managerial
opportunism through some mechanism (board of directors, independent directors, internal
control systems, board diversity . . .). In this broader context, codes of ethics represent one of
the main corporate governance mechanisms used to reduce managerial opportunism.
While most of the studies about code of ethics do not make the theoretical mechanisms
underlying their hypotheses explicit, we draw from the field of economics and we utilize
Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm activation to explain the reasons why codes of ethics
may help reduce managerial opportunism. Bicchieri (2006) suggests that social norm activation
creates relevant beliefs and expectations that impact behaviors. Davidson and Stevens (2013)
assert that a code of ethics can affect this change in beliefs by activating social norms that help
control opportunistic behaviors. More specifically, a code of ethics activates the social norms by
(1) making relevant behavioral rules salient; (2) increasing the belief that a sufficiently large
subset of the population conforms to the relevant behavioral rules made salient by the code, and
(3) increasing the motivation to follow the relevant behavioral rules made salient by the code
through the belief that such rules are valid or reasonable (Bicchieri, 2006).
Following the literature supporting the opportunism constraining view of a code of ethics
and the models proposed by Bicchieri (2006), one would expect codes of ethics to shape
employees’ behavior by reducing their opportunism. As managerial opportunism is a source
of risk, we would expect investors to consider, ceteris paribus, companies with a code of ethics
to be less risky. Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) argue that codes of ethics are mere rhetoric
because of the way they are implemented by companies, not because of their intrinsic nature.
Similarly, Anand et al. (2004) notice that Enron had a code of ethics, but this did not stop
executives from behaving unethically and conclude that adopting a code of ethics is a positive
development, but it is not sufficient.
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We build on the idea that the mere presence of a code of ethics is not enough to draw any
definitive conclusions on its effectiveness and we take a step forward by studying the quality
of the code of ethics. We define a code of ethics quality as reflecting the comprehensiveness of
the code content and the comprehensiveness of the system for implementing it. Both elements
are important determinants of a code’s potential effectiveness (Chen et al., 2018). For instance,
a code of ethics may have low comprehensiveness and only mention obeying laws and
regulations. Conversely, it may have a high comprehensiveness, being more specific and
providing more guidance on how to address problems related to giving and receiving bribes,
gifts, facilitation payments, donations to political parties, and commitment to honesty,
integrity, and fairness. A code may be implemented through a system with a low
comprehensiveness, thus including only whistleblowing procedures, or it may rely on a
system with high comprehensiveness and also providing employee training and compliance
monitoring, including details of breaches and enforcements in reports, and undertaking a
regular review of the code of ethics.
We posit that a code of ethics brings benefits only when it is developed to deter
wrongdoing and promote ethical conduct and when such a code is infused into business
culture through implementation. We refer these codes to high-quality codes of ethics. Based
on the theoretical prediction of Bicchieri (2006), we expect to find a negative association
between a high-quality code of ethics and the cost of equity.
We propose our hypothesis as follows:
H1. The higher the code of ethics quality, the lower the cost of equity.

4. Research design
4.1 Data and sample
Following prior research (Scholtens and Dam, 2007; Chen et al., 2018) we obtain the data on
the corporate codes of ethics of US public firms included in the S&P 500 index from the
Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS) for the period 2004–2012. The sample is
restricted to the S&P 500 and the period due to the availability of corporate codes of ethics
data. Our initial data sample from EIRIS has 3,520 firm-year observations. We then merge the
EIRIS US sample with Compustat North America and the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) and I/B/E/S databases to get financial and accounting data. The final main
sample has 2,207 firm-year observations from 337 unique firms between the sample period
2004 and 2012.
4.2 Regression variables
4.2.1 Code of ethics quality. To specify our proxy for the quality of a code of ethics, we obtain the
data on corporate codes of ethics from EIRIS, a non-profit, independent research organization.
EIRIS has been conducting social, environmental, and ethical research on public firms since
1983. EIRIS gathers data annually through questionnaires and surveys across six different
areas: the quality of a code of ethics, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility
issues, environmental issues, human rights, and positive products and services. EIRIS database
covers about 3,000 firms from 40 different countries. In the US, EIRIS covers all firms included
in the S&P 500 and this is the focus of our study. EIRIS code of ethics data has been used in prior
research, i.e. Scholtens and Dam (2007) and Chen et al. (2018).
EIRIS organizes the various measures of the quality of a code of ethics into four
categories: Systems (SYSTEM), Implementation (IMPLEMENT), Corruption (CORRUPT),
and Human Right (HUMAN). SYSTEM is the measure of the comprehensiveness of a
company’s code of ethics, IMPLEMENT measures the extent to which a company has a

system for implementing the code of ethics, CORRUPT is the company tolerance of
unethical practices, HUMAN measures the extent to which the company manages human
right issues. For instance, SYSTEM is measured based on the answer to the question “Does
the company have a code of ethics and, if so, how comprehensive is it?” The possible answers
are coded as 0 if a company does not have a code of ethics, coded as 1 if a company has
adopted a code of ethics but no further details available beyond this point, coded as 2 if a
company has adopted a code of ethics and has only one specific ethics element out of the
elements follows: obeys laws and regulations; prohibits giving and receiving bribes;
restricts giving and receiving gifts; restricts facilitation payments; prohibits donations to
political parties; and commitment to honesty, integrity, and fairness; coded as 3 if a
company has adopted a code of ethics and the code has four or five specific ethics elements
and coded as 4 if a company has adopted a code of ethics and the code has all specific ethics
elements. Please refer to Appendix A for more detailed descriptions of the ethics component
constructions.
To create an aggregate measure of corporate code of ethics, we use factor analysis to
combine the four measures (SYSTEM, IMPLEMENT, CORRUPT, and HUMAN) of the
quality of a code of ethics developed by EIRIS. Our factor analysis yields one factor with an
Eigenvalue of 2.15. We name this factor ETHICS.
4.2.2 Cost of equity. Following Hail and Leuz (2006) and Dhaliwal et al. (2006), we estimate
the ex ante cost of equity implied in the current stock prices and market expectations
measured by financial analyst forecasts by using four different models: the Gebhardt et al.
(2001), the Claus and Thomas (2001) model, the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model,
and the Easton (2004) model. We denote the cost of equity derived from the four above models
r_GLS, r_CT, r_OJ, and r_ET, respectively [2]. These four measures of the cost of equity have
been used widely in accounting and finance literature [3]. However, there is no consensus as to
the superiority of any particular model in estimating the cost of equity, and therefore limiting
the empirical analysis to just one model measure may yield spurious results (Dhaliwal et al.,
2006, p. 699). To reduce the spurious results associated with the use of one single model, we
follow Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Hail and Leuz (2006) and use the average of the four estimates
of the cost of equity, r_AVG, in our empirical tests.
4.2.3 Control variables. We follow prior studies (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006;
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Shen and Zhang, 2020) to include controls shown to affect the cost of
equity. The control variables include Beta (BETA), Size (SIZE), Book-to-market (BTM),
Leverage (LEV), Long-term growth rate (LTG), Analyst forecast dispersion (DISP), Dividend
payout (DIV), Corporate Governance (GOV), and Corporate social responsibility (CSR).
4.2.4 Model specifications. To test our hypothesis, we use the following regression model:
X
r AVGi;t ¼ β0 þ β1 ETHICS þ Controls þ
YearIndicators
X
(1)
þ
IndustryIndicators þ εi;t
where the subscripts i and t denote firm i and year t, respectively. r_AVG is the average cost
of equity, ETHICS is the measure of the quality of a code of ethics, and the control variables
are specified above. Consistent with our hypothesis, we expect to find a significant and
negative coefficient of β1.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Univariate analysis
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for ETHICS, the cost of equity variables – r_GLS, r_CT,
r_OJ, r_ET, and their average r_AVG – and control variables. The ETHICS scores exhibit
large variation across firms over the sample period. The mean (median) of ETHICS in our
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics

N

Mean

Min

Q1

Median

Q3

Max

Standard deviation

r_AVG
ETHICS
BETA
SIZE
BTM
LEV
LTG
DISP
GOV
CSR
DIV
INST
ANACOV

2,207
9.68%
4.12%
6.94%
8.57% 11.07% 18.17%
3.17%
2,207
0.55
0.00
0.10
0.45
0.86
2.25
0.51
2,207
1.01
0.11
0.65
0.99
1.38
2.25
0.52
2,207 16.13
14.68
15.43
16.01
16.72
18.43
0.87
2,207
0.94
0.27
0.53
0.78
1.22
2.80
0.54
2,207
0.20
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.29
0.50
0.13
2,207 12.59%
5.00%
9.96% 12.29% 15.00% 23.01%
3.77%
2,207
0.11
0.01
0.03
0.06
0.13
0.56
0.11
2,207
2.23
0.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
0.53
2,207
2.22
0.00
0.00
2.00
4.70
9.20
2.99
2,207
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.33
0.77
0.20
2,207
0.82
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.38
2,207 17.33
1.00
12.00
17.00
22.00
53.00
7.35
2,207
SYSTEM
2,207
3.40
0.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
0.86
IMPLEMENT 2,207
2.63
0.00
2.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
0.94
CORRUPT
2,207
1.34
0.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
3.00
0.91
HUMAN
2,207
0.41
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
3.00
0.70
2,207
r_GLS
2,207
7.54%
3.62%
6.98%
7.31%
8.81% 12.64%
2.04%
r_CT
2,207 10.06%
1.00%
1.00% 10.95% 14.65% 25.00%
6.67%
r_OJ
2,207
6.47%
0.18%
1.00%
1.49% 13.28% 24.84%
7.41%
r_ET
2,207 11.11%
4.48%
7.83%
9.41% 12.19% 25.00%
5.39%
Note(s): This table presents the mean, minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, maximum, and
standard deviation of the regression variables for the main sample for the period between 2004 and 2012.
A more detailed description of the variables is in Appendix A

sample is 0.55 (0.45) with a standard deviation of 0.51. The average cost of equity across four
models is 9.68%. The Easton (2004) model provides the highest estimate (11.11%) while the
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) yields the lowest estimate (6.47%) for the cost of equity.
The means of the cost of equity generated from the Gebhardt et al. (2001) model and from the
Claus and Thomas (2001) are 7.54% and 10.06%, respectively. These estimates are in line
with the results reported in Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Hail and Leuz (2006).
Table 2 provides Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients of our main regression variables.
The cost of equity variable – r_AVG – is significantly and negatively correlated with the
quality of a code of ethics variable – ETHICS. The correlation coefficient is 0.06 with a p-value
of less than one percent. This result provides preliminary support to our first hypothesis.
Table 3 reports our univariate results of the test of our first hypothesis. We compare the
means (panel A, Table 3) and the medians (panel B, Table 3) of each of the four costs of equity
estimates (r_GLS, r_CT, r_OJ, r_ET) and their average (r_AVG) of the firms in the upper
quartile with those of the firms in the lower quartile distribution of ETHICS. The mean
(median) of the average cost of equity of firms in the upper quartile of ETHICS distribution is
9.40% (8.08%), while it is 9.84% (8.61%) for firms in the lower quartile. These results suggest
that the mean (median) of the cost of equity for firms in the upper quartile is 44 (53) basis
points lower than that for firms in the lower quartile of ETHICS score distribution. These
differences are significant at the 5% level for the mean values and the 1% for median values.
We find consistent results when examining the differences in mean and median values using
each of the four estimates of the cost of equity. Overall, the univariate results suggest that
consistent with the prediction of our first hypothesis, firms with a higher quality code of
ethics have a significantly lower cost of equity.

ETHICS

BETA

SIZE

BTM

LEV

LTG

DISP

GOV

CSR

DIV

INST

ETHICS
0.06***
BETA
0.08***
0.01
SIZE
0.12***
0.08***
0.06***
BTM
0.21***
0.04***
0.12***
0.18***
LEV
0.03
0.07***
0.05**
0.03
0.31***
LTG
0.10***
0.09***
0.03
0.02
0.08***
0.13***
DISP
0.17***
0.02
0.07***
0.04**
0.20***
0.02
0.04*
GOV
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.08***
0.15***
0.00
0.06***
CSR
0.01
0.12***
0.11
0.35***
0.03
0.22***
0.24***
0.08***
0.08***
DIV
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.04**
INST
0.04*
0.06***
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.09***
0.08***
0.11***
0.01
0.07***
0.02
ANACOV
0.04*
0.08***
0.03
0.46***
0.10***
0.19***
0.11***
0.01
0.05***
0.06***
0.02
0.06***
Note(s): This table reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients of the main regression variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 level, respectively. A more detailed description of the variables is in Appendix A

r_AVG

Code of ethics
and cost of
equity capital

9

Table 2.
Correlation coefficients
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Table 3.
Firms with high and
low quality of code of
ethics

N
Panel A: Means
ETHICS in the
upper quartile
ETHICS in the
lower quartile
Difference
t-Statistic
One sided
p-value

r_AVG

r_GLS

r_CT

r_OJ

r_ET

(1)

548

9.40%

7.48%

9.84%

7.57%

11.96%

(2)

861

9.84%

8.07%

10.59%

8.46%

12.99%

0.44%**
1.64
(0.05)

0.59%***
3.38
(<0.01)

(1)–(2)

0.75%***
1.75
(<0.01)

0.89%*
1.39
(0.08)

1.03%**
1.76
(0.04)

Panel B: Medians
ETHICS in the
(1)
548
8.08%
7.02%
10.82%
1.00%
8.78%
upper quartile
ETHICS in the
(2)
861
8.61%
7.76%
11.16%
2.08%
9.74%
lower quartile
Difference
(1)–(2)
0.53%*** 0.74%**
0.34%**
1.08%*** 0.96%***
Z-Statistic
2.27
4.46
1.33
2.38
4.46
One sided
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.01)
(<0.01)
p-value
Note(s): This table presents mean (panel A) and median (panel B) comparison tests for four individual and
average cost of capital estimates across subsamples of upper and lower quartiles of ETHICS. The total sample
includes 548 firm-year observations in the upper quartile subsample and 861 firm-year observations in the
lower quartile subsample for the period between 2004 and 2012. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. A more detailed description of the variables is in Appendix A

5.2 Multivariate regression analysis
In our multivariate tests, we regress the cost of equity variable – r_AVG, on ETHICS and other
control variables using pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions with robust standard
errors clustered by firms and by years and controlling for industry and firm fixed effects.
Table 4 reports the multivariate regression results. Consistent with our univariate results
reported in Table 3, the multivariate regression results show a significant impact of ETHICS on
the cost of equity. In Model 1, we examine the impact of ETHICS on the cost of equity while
controlling for industry and year fixed effects. The coefficient of ETHICS is negatively
significant. The result indicates that firms with a higher quality code of ethics have a
significantly lower cost of equity. This significant relation remains robust when we include a
battery of control variables. Overall, our multivariate results provide strong support to our first
hypothesis that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity.
Economically, the estimated coefficient of ETHICS in Column 2 suggests that a one-standarddeviation increase in ETHICS leads to a 29-basis-point reduction in the cost of equity.
In Table 5, we extend our analysis to examine the association between the quality of a code
of ethics and each of the four estimates of the cost of equity (Columns 1 to 4), then the
association between the average cost of equity and each of the measures of the quality of a
code of ethics (Columns 5 to 8) and then, finally the association between the average cost of
equity and all four measures of the quality of a code of ethics in Column 9.
We find that the coefficient of ETHICS is consistently negative and statistically
significant when we use the individual measure of the cost of equity (r_GLS, r_CT, r_OJ, and
r_ET). These results reinforce our earlier evidence that a higher quality code of ethics lowers
the cost of equity. To provide more insights into the association between the quality of a code
of ethics and the cost of equity, we re-examine and report the results of the association
between each of the four measures of the quality of a code of ethics and the cost of equity in

Dependent variable: r_AVG
Predicted sign

(1)

(2)

Code of ethics
and cost of
equity capital

ETHICS

0.342** (2.38)
0.288*** (3.06)
BETA
þ
0.141 (1.58)
SIZE

0.899*** (3.62)
BTM
þ
0.335* (1.73)
LEV
þ
0.581 (0.53)
11
LTG
þ
7.673*** (3.13)
DISP
þ
4.275*** (5.58)
DIV

0.008*** (2.41)
GOV

0.009 (0.59)
CSR

0.322* (1.71)
INST

0.023 (0.76)
ANACOV
−
0.038** (2.01)
ANABIAS
þ
1.879 (0.49)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Industry fixed effects
Yes
Yes
N
2,207
2,207
3.56%
13.68%
R2
Note(s): This table presents the regression results of regressing the average cost of equity (r_AVG) on
Table 4.
ETHICS and controls over the sample period between 2004 and 2012. Robust standard errors are clustered by Code of Ethics Quality
firms. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, and the Cost of Equity
0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. A more detailed description of the variables is in Appendix A
– Multivariate results

Columns 5 to 8 of Table 5. We aim to determine whether certain measures of the quality of a
code of ethics are more important than the others in affecting a firm’s cost of equity. The
regression results suggest that all four measures of the quality of a code of ethics are
negatively associated with the cost of equity. CORRUPT and HUMAN coefficients are
statistically significant while SYSTEM and IMPLEMENT coefficients are statistically
insignificant. We then include all four components of the quality of a code of ethics as
independent variables in Column 9. All four components of the quality of a code of ethics are
loaded negatively and statistically significant. The results suggest that while being
separated, SYSTEM and IMPLEMENT do not have a significant effect on lowering the cost
of equity. Recall that the SYSTEM variable measures the existence of a code of ethics and the
comprehensiveness of the code if the firm has a code of ethics, and that IMPLEMENT
measures a firm’s compliance and implementation procedures of their code of ethics. The
results are in line with Vethouse and Kandogan (2007) because if a firm has a code of ethics
but does not implement it, then the code would be “window dressing” and should not have
any effect. The results in Model 9 of Table 5 suggest that firms with a more comprehensive
code of ethics and a system for implementing a code, policies, and procedures to deter
corruption and bribery and a system and policies to address human rights issues would
experience a significant lower cost of equity.
Our empirical results provide strong support for our first hypothesis, and they are in line
with the “opportunism constraint view” of the code of ethics, conditional on the implementation
of the code. The theoretical model underlying our analysis (Bicchieri, 2006) connects the code of
ethics to the cost of equity through lower managerial opportunism and financial misconduct.
5.3 Endogeneity concern
Similar to other related corporate code of ethics studies, one concern is the potential
endogeneity problem (driven by omitted variables, reverse causality, and sample selection

Table 5.
Individual measure of
code of ethics quality
and individual estimate
of the cost of equity
0.265** (2.29)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
13.43%

0.324*** (5.53)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
19.78%

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
5.21%

0.626** (2.17)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
15.14%

0.468** (2.38)

r_ET
(4)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
13.47%

0.096 (1.45)

(5)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
13.51%

0.141 (1.59)

(6)

Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
13.66%

0.255** (1.91)

(7)

(8)

0.404** (2.00)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
13.65%

Dependent variable: r_AVG

0.430*** (3.14)
0.044* (1.76)
0.560*** (4.01)
0.397* (1.98)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,207
14.24%

(9)

Note(s): This table presents the regression results of regressing the average cost of equity (r_AVG) on ETHICS and control variables over the sample period between
2004 and 2012. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 level, respectively. A more detailed description of the variables is in Appendix A







Dependent variable:
Individual Cost of equity Estimates
r_CT
r_OJ
(2)
(3)
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ETHICS
SYSTEM
IMPLEMENT
CORRUPT
HUMAN
Control variables
Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
N
R2

Predicted sign

r_GLS
(1)
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bias) which may cause spurious results about the relation between the quality of a code of
ethics and the cost of equity. In this section, we employ five approaches to ensure the
robustness of our analysis. The approaches include (1) change regression; (2) addition of
earning quality and internal control as control variables to our baseline regression;
(3) dynamic panel model estimated using GMM technique to mitigate the issue of reverse
causality; (4) Heckman two-stage regression to mitigate the issue of selection bias and
(5) difference-in-difference analysis.
First, the negative relation between the quality of a code of ethics and the cost of equity
capital may be due to endogenous feedback from the cost of equity capital to a code of ethics.
To deal with this concern, we estimate a model based on temporal changes in the cost of
equity and changes in the quality of a code of ethics. The regression model is specified as
follows:
Δr AVGi;t ¼ δ0 þ δ1 ΔETHICS þ ΔControls þ wi;t

(2)

where Δ indicates the change operator. The regression results of Model 2 are presented in
Table 6 (Column 1). The coefficient of ETHICS is negative (0.391) and significant at the 1
percent level (p-value is 0.004).
Second, to further mitigate the potential omitted variable bias and to improve the precision
of our estimates, we add more control variables from prior research that are documented to
have an impact on the cost of equity to our main regression model, such as earnings quality
(Francis et al., 2008). The test results are reported in Table 6 (Columns 2 and 3) and they are
consistent with our findings reported previously.
Beneish et al. (2008) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) provide evidence suggesting that
the revelations of internal control deficiencies under SOX 404 affect a firm’s cost of equity. To
control for the impact of internal control deficiency, we include a dummy variable for internal
control deficiency, ICD, in our robustness test and report the estimation results in Table 6
(Column 4). We use the same measure of internal control deficiency as in Doyle et al. (2007) and
we obtain the data on ICD from Sarah McVay’s website. The estimation results are robust
and support our prediction about the negative relation between the quality of a code of
ethics and the cost of equity.
The third approach deals with the causality between code of ethics and the cost of equity
and it is based on Klein (1998), which address the endogeneity concern of reverse causality
(i.e. the quality of a code of ethics may be affected by the cost of equity in the previous period).
We include the lagged cost of equity, r_AVGt-1, as an independent variable and estimate this
dynamic panel model using the system GMM technique developed in Blundell and Bond
(1998). The GMM estimation results are presented in Column 5 of Table 6. We find that
ETHICS continues to load negatively at the 5% confidence level, reinforcing our previous
findings of a negative relation between the quality of a code of ethics (ETHICS) and the cost of
equity capital.
Fourth, the selection bias may affect our results. To address the concern, we adopt the
two-stage Heckman approach. In the first stage estimation, we include the proportion of
firms that early adopted a code of ethics in an industry as an exogenous variable. The
proportion of early-adopting firms can affect a firm’s selection because of industry peer
effects. Firms operating in an industry with more firms adopting a code of ethics are more
likely to adopt a code of ethics and are more likely to implement the code. In the second
stage, we include the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first stage estimation as a control
variable.
As specified in the Data and Sample in Section 4, our sample includes US public firms in
the S&P 500 index during the period between 2004 and 2012. Since the sample period is after
the effective date of the disclosure requirement of Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
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Table 6.
Addressing
endogeneity concern
(2)

0.211 (1.45)
0.246** (2.34)
1.095*** (9.58)
1.709** (2.23)
6.221*** (3.57)
1.359*** (5.48)
0.007 (0.42)
0.089 (0.43)
0.042 (1.06)
7.707*** (3.56)

1,926
10.27%

1,905
1.00%

1,926
10.05%

3.846*** (2.83)

0.203 (1.40)
0.250** (2.37)
1.096*** (9.57)
1.703** (2.22)
6.438*** (3.704)
1.425*** (5.76)
0.007 (0.38)
0.101 (0.49)
0.038 (0.96)

0.291** (2.41) 0.301*** (2.48)

0.256 (0.78)
0.250*** (7.68)
0.094 (1.23)
0.238 (1.12)
4.126** (1.86)
0.408** (2.00)
0.019 (1.54)
0.047 (0.68)
0.079 (0.98)

0.391*** (5.98)

Earnings quality

(3)

420
9.02%

0.155 (0.12)

0.292** (2.14)
0.437*** (4.44)
0.663*** (7.81)
0.625 (0.92)
8.759*** (5.91)
1.518*** (6.13)
0.011 (0.60)
0.065 (0.34)
0.062 (1.59)

0.379*** (3.20)

Internal control
deficiency

(4)

1,905

0.147*** (5.33)

0.002* (1.82)
0.001* (1.76)
5.716*** (4.77)
0.012** (2.00)
0.086*** (5.26)
0.030*** (6.56)
0.015*** (4.48)
0.002 (0.28)
0.002 (1.53)

0.002** (1.98)

GMM

(5)

2,207
11.5%

0.439*** (2.46)

0.389*** (4.68)
0.244*** (7.69)
0.235*** (5.60)
0.279 (0.97)
1.420* (1.76)
1.277* (1.78)
0.142*** (5.41)

(6)
1st stage Heckman
2-stage regression (dependent
variable 5 EarlyAdopt)

0.147 (0.37)
2,207
8.95%

0.014*** (2.88)
0.001 (0.45)
0.007*** (2.76)
0.069*** (3.92)
0.445*** (11.10)
0.249*** (2.71)
0.002* (1.76)

0.003* (1.75)

(7)
2nd stage
Heckman 2-stage
regression

7,689
17.97%

0.005*** (3.15)
0.005*** (8.56)
0.004*** (3.29)
0.025*** (7.44)
0.033*** (8.84)
0.098*** (2.68)
0.009*** (12.11)

0.007*** (5.52)
0.011*** (5.08)
0.005** (2.15)

Diff-in-diff Analysis

(8)

This table presents the regression results of regressing the average cost of equity (r_AVG) on ETHICS and control variables. The sample period in Models 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7
is between 2004 and 2012, in Model 4 is between January 2004 and October 2005, and in Model 8 is between 1996 and 2012. The dependent variable in Model 6 is
EarlyAdopt. Robust standard errors are clustered by firms. t-statistics are reported inside the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10 level, respectively. A more detailed description of the variables is in Appendix A

ETHICS
NonEarlyAdopt
PostSOX
NonEarlyAdopt x
PostSOX
BETA
SIZE
BTM
LEV
LTG
DISP
DIV
GOV
CSR
ACCR1
ACCR2
ICD
Lag (r_AVG)
IndAvgAdopt
Inverse Mills Ratio
N
R2

(1)
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at changes
Earnings quality

Dependent variable: r_avg
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Act (SOX), we would not assume that the firms not included in our sample do not adopt a code
of ethics. Instead, we collect data of firms that voluntarily adopt a code of ethics before 2003,
the disclosure requirement year of SOX. We call these firms “early adopters”. To retrieve
information on codes of ethics (also known as code of business conduct), we use a text search
algorithm (web crawler) to search annual filings from the SEC website from 1996 to 2002. We
start at the year 1996 because of the readability of SEC electronic filings. The keywords and
phrases used for the search are: “code of ethics”, “code of business conduct”, “code of conduct”,
“code of business ethics”, and “ethics”. The web crawler retrieves the CIK from the filings and
downloads the paragraph containing the key searching words or phrases into an excel file
whenever it finds them. We then filter the search results by keeping only firms in the S&P 500
index. The final sample has 2,205 firm-year observations, out of which 157 firms are code-ofethics early adopters. We then manually check these 157 early adopters to avoid a Type I
error, where the null hypothesis of no line credit is rejected when in fact it is true. We do not
find any errors among these 157 early adopters. We merge 157 early adopters to our main
sample and create a dummy variable EarlyAdopt that takes the value of 1 if a firm is an early
adopter and zero otherwise.
In the first stage of Heckman two-stage estimation, the dependent variable is
EarlyAdopt, and an additional independent variable is the industry proportion of early
adopters (IndAvgAdopt). Due to peer effects, firms operating in an industry with more
early adopters tend to adopt a code of ethics. The first-stage probit model is specified as
follows:
EarlyAdopti;t ¼ γ 0 þ γ 1 BETAi;t þ γ 2 SIZEi;t þ γ 3 BTMi;t þ γ 4 LEVi;t þ γ 5 LTGi;t
þ γ 6 DISPi;t þ γ 7 DIVi;t þ γ 8 IndAdvAdopti;t þ υi;t

(3)

Details on the definitions and constructions of the variables are included in Appendix A. The
estimation results of Model 3 are reported in Column 6 of Table 6. The expected value of the
dependent variable in Model 3 is included in the second stage estimation as the Inverse Mills
Ratio and the second stage regression model is as follows:
X
YearIndicators
r AVGi;t ¼ λ0 þ λ1 ETHICS þ λ2 InvMillsRatio þ Controls þ
X
(4)
þ
IndustryIndicators þ εi;t
The estimation result of Model 4 is reported in Column 7 of Table 6. The Inverse Mills Ratio is
statistically insignificant, indicating that there is no sample selection bias. The coefficient of
ETHICS continues to be negatively significant and the results are consistent with our prior
findings.
Finally, we use the passage of SOX Section 406 as a natural experiment and adopt the
difference-in-differences approach to examine the impact of Section 406 compliance on the
cost of equity. We use the early adopters as our baseline. If Section 406 compliance has any
impact on the cost of equity, we would expect to find a negative coefficient on the interaction
of the PostSOX dummy variable and NonEarlyAdopt variable. Our difference-in-difference
regression model is specified as follows:
r AVGi;t ¼ θ0 þ θ1 NonEarlyAdopti;t þ θ2 PostSOXi;t þ θ3 NonEarlyAdopt 3 PostSOXi;t
(5)
þ Controls þ εi;t
We use the dataset of a code of ethics adoption between 1996 and 2012 and use SOX as a
natural experiment to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. NonEarlyAdopt is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm does not adopt a code of ethics before 2003
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and zero otherwise. PostSOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is after
2003 and zero otherwise. Our variable of interest is the interaction between NonEarlyAdopt
and PostSOX. If Section 406 mandatory compliance creates any impact on the cost of equity,
then we expect to find the coefficient θ3 to be negatively significant. Consistent with our
expectation, the coefficient θ3 is 0.005 and significant at less than 5% level (Column 8,
Table 6).

16
6. Conclusions
This paper examines whether the quality of a code of ethics affects a firm’s cost of equity.
While there is no previous evidence on this research question, previous literature offers
arguments both supporting (“opportunism constraint view”) and neglecting (“windowdressing view”) the existence of a negative relation between the quality of a code of ethics and
the cost of equity. Following Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm activation and Davidson
and Stevens (2013) assertion that a high-quality code of ethics can activate social norms that
help to control opportunistic behaviors, we posit that firms with a higher quality code of
ethics have a lower cost of equity. Using a sample of public firms included in the S&P 500
index in the US, we find strong evidence supporting our hypothesis that a high-quality code
of ethics significantly lowers the cost of equity. The findings are robust to a battery of
robustness checks.
Overall, our findings suggest that not only the adoption but also the implementation of
a code of ethics creates benefits to companies. Our findings move the literature forward
by showing that the implementation of a code of ethics plays a significant role in reducing
the cost of equity. This missing key element of implementation may be the reason for
mixed findings in the extant literature. Section 406 of SOX only requires US firms to adopt
a code of ethics but does not require the disclosure of the code content or the
implementation procedures. Our findings highlight the importance of compliance and the
alignment between words and deeds. Thus, SOX regulators may find our findings as a
meaningful policy implication. Future research can extend our study by investigating
other possible channels through which a high-quality code of ethics can lower the cost of
equity.
Although our sample only includes the US S&P 500 companies, the findings are
meaningful not only for these company’s shareholders but also for the stakeholders all over
the world because more than 40% of the sales of the US S&P 500 firms are to global
customers. We call for future research to investigate the role of a code of ethics using other
country samples to examine the role of institutional systems such as national culture, market
development, and legal system on the effectiveness of a code of ethics.
Our results contribute to practice as companies may find our results useful in evaluating
whether to invest resources in the implementation of a code of ethics. More specifically, we
pointed out the benefits deriving from a code of ethics implementation. We also contribute to
practice by highlighting that how a code of ethics is implemented does matter. More
specifically, benefits in terms of lower managerial opportunism will arise only when
companies actually (and not only formally) implement their code of ethics.
Notes
1. See the “Report to the nations” by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). https://
www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2020/, accessed November 3, 2020.
2. Please refer to Appendix B for detailed descriptions of these cost of equity measures.
3. Please refer to previous studies such as Dhaliwal et al. (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006), El Ghoul et al.
(2011), Shen and Zhang (2020) in accounting and finance literature.
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Appendix A
Variable definitions, constructions and data sources

Variable

Definition

Construction

Data Source

r_AVG

Average cost of equity

r_AVG 5
(r_GLS þ r_CT þ r_OJ þ r_ET)/4

r_GLS

Cost of equity derived from
Gebhardt et al. (2001)
model

Details in Appendix B.1

r_CT

Cost of equity derived from
Claus and Thomas (2001)
model

Details in Appendix B.2

r_OJ

Cost of equity derived from
Ohlson and JuettnerNauroth (2005) model

Details in Appendix B.3

r_ET

Cost of equity derived from
Easton (2004) model

Details in Appendix B.4

ETHICS

A code of ethics specifies
an organization’s primary
values and ethical rules
that are designed to
promote right behaviors
and deter wrong behaviors

SYSTEM

Comprehensiveness of a
firm’s code of ethics

IMPLEMENT

Compliance of a firm’s
code of ethics

We conduct a factor analysis to
aggregate the four measures of Ethics:
Systems; Implementation; Corruption;
and Human Right. The factor analysis
provides one factor with Eigen value
greater than one. We name this factor
Ethics
The answer to the question: “Does the
firm have a code of ethics and, if so, how
comprehensive it is?” the possible
answers are: no (coded 5 0); limited
(coded 5 1); basic (coded 5 2);
intermediate (coded 5 3); and advanced
(coded 5 4)
The answer to the question: “Does the
firm have a system for implementing a
code of ethics and, if so, how
comprehensive it is?” the possible
answers are: no (coded 5 0); limited
(coded 5 1); basic (coded 5 2);
intermediate (coded 5 3); and advanced
(coded 5 4)

Authors’
calculations based
on I/B/E/S and
compustat North
America
Authors’
calculations based
on I/B/E/S and
compustat North
America
Authors’
calculations based
on I/B/E/S and
compustat North
America
Authors’
calculations based
on I/B/E/S and
compustat North
America
Authors’
calculations based
on I/B/E/S and
compustat North
America
Authors’
calculations based
on ethical
investment research
service (EIRIS)
database
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Ethical investment
research service
(EIRIS) database

Ethical investment
research service
(EIRIS) database

(continued )

Variable

Definition

Construction

Data Source

CORRUPT

Deterrence of corruption
as a proxy for doing the
wrong things

The answer to the question: “Does the
company have policies and procedures
on bribery and corruption?” the possible
answers are: the firm has no policy
disclosed (coded 5 0); the firm has
adopted a policy (coded 5 1); or the firm
has a clear policy and procedures
(coded 5 2)
The answers to the question: “What is
the extent of policy and systems
addressing human right issues?” the
possible answers are: No evidence
(coded as 0); limited (coded as 1);
Intermediate (coded as 2); Advance or
good (coded as 3)
The firm’s rolling beta estimated by
regressing 60 months excess stock
returns ending in June of year t on the
corresponding monthly CRSP valueweighted index excess returns. Monthly
excess returns are monthly returns
minus the one-month treasury bill rate.
We require a minimum of 12 months of
observations in Beta estimation
Log (Fiscal year-end stock price x total
common shares outstanding)
Log(prcc_f x csho)
Total assets/(fiscal year-end stock price
x total common shares outstanding) at/
(prcc_f x csho)
Total debt divided by total assets
(dlc þ dltt)/at
The average long-term growth forecast
reported in June of year t
The standard deviation of one-yearahead analyst forecasts of earnings per
share in June of year t
Total dividend payment scaled by net
income. dvt/ni
The answers to the question: “Does the
company: (1) separate the roles of
chairman and chief executive; (2) have a
board comprising of more than 33%
independent directors; (3) have an audit
committee comprising a majority of
independent directors; and (4) disclose
executive and director remuneration?”
the possible answers are: None (coded
as 0); one (coded as 1); Some (coded as 2);
All (coded as 3)

Ethical investment
research service
(EIRIS) database

HUMAN

Promotion of human right
as a proxy for doing the
right things

BETA

Systematic risk

SIZE

Natural logarithm of a firm
market value

BTM

Book-to-market

LEV

Leverage

LTG

Long-term growth

DISP

Analyst forecast
dispersion

DIV

Dividend payment

GOV

Corporate governance
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Ethical investment
research service
(EIRIS) database

Authors’ calculation
based on CRSP data
and market data
from Ken French’s
website: http://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/Faculty/ken.
French/data_library.
html
Compustat North
America database
Compustat North
America database
Compustat North
America database
I/B/E/S database
I/B/E/S database
Compustat North
America database
Ethical investment
research service
(EIRIS) database
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Variable

Definition

Construction

Data Source

CSR

Corporate social
responsibility

An aggregate measure of corporate
social responsibility based on three
dimensions: (1) community
performance (graded from 1 to 4);
(2) environmental performance (graded
from 1 to 5) and employee performance
(graded from 1 to 3)

INST

Institutional holding

Coded as 1 if a firm-year has at least one
institutional holder reported in the form
13 F to the SEC

ANACOV

Analyst coverage

ANABIAS

Analyst forecast bias

ACCR1

Earnings quality

Log (1þ the number of analyst
estimates issued on a stock at the end of
the year)
Difference between the mean value of
the 1-year-ahead consensus earnings
forecasts and actual earnings scaled by
stock price
Absolute value of abnormal accruals
estimated based on Dechow et al. (1995)
model

Authors’ calculation
following the
aggregation method
specified in
Brammer and
Pavelin (2006) using
ethical investment
research service
(EIRIS) database
SEC website: https://
www.sec.gov/
divisions/
Investment/13flists.
htm
I/B/E/S database

ACCR2

Earnings quality

Absolute value of abnormal accruals
estimated based on Kothari et al. (2005)
model

ICD

Internal control deficiency

A dummy variable that takes a value of
1 if a firm report internal control
deficiency and zero otherwise

EarlyAdopt

Early adopted a code of
ethics in the period prior to
2003

A dummy variable that takes a value of
1 if a firm early adopts a code of ethics
before 2003 zero otherwise

IndAvgAdopt

The industry proportion of
firms early adopted a code
of ethics prior to 2003

Average of EarlyAdopt

Inverse Mills
Ratio

The expected probability
of early adoption of a code
of ethics

Expected value of the dependent
variable in Equation 4
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I/B/E/S database

Authors’
calculations based
on compustat North
America database
Authors’
calculations based
on compustat North
America database
The data contains
material weakness
disclosures from
2004 to 2005,
provided by Sarah
McVay http://
faculty.washington.
edu/smcvay/ICdata.
html
Author’s
constructions based
on the annual filings
data available on
SEC website
Author’s
constructions based
on the annual filings
data available on
SEC website
Author’s
constructions based
on the annual filings
data available on
SEC website and
data from compustat
North America

Appendix B
Cost of equity models
B.1. Gebhardt et al. (2001) model – r_GLS
Gebhardt et al. (2001) model assume clean surplus accounting and allows share price to be expressed as
forecasted returns on equity (ROE) and book values (BV). The forecast horizon is set to three years. After
three years, forecasted ROE is assumed to be equal to the median industry ROE by the 12th year and
then remains constant. The industry classification is defined according to the Fama and French (1997)
classification and the industry median ROE is computed over the past ten years excluding loss firms.
Dividend payout is assumed to be constant. The valuation equation is specified as follows:

Pt ¼ BVt þ

11
X
FROEτþt  kGLS
FROEtþ12  kGLS
Btþτ−1 þ
Btþ11
τ
ð1 þ kGLS Þ
kGLS ð1 þ kGLS Þ11
τþ1

Where FROE is forecasted return on equity, BVtþτ ¼ BVtþτ−1 ð1 − DPRtþτ Þ and DPR is the expected
dividend payout ratio and equals to the ratio between the actual dividend per share in year t-1 and actual
earnings per share in year t-1. If earnings per share in year t-1 is negative, it will be replaced by the
implied value of 6% return on assets which is the assumed long-term return on assets of the US).
B.2. Claus and Thomas (2001) model – r_CT
Claus and Thomas (2001) model assumes clean surplus accounting and allows share price to be
expressed as forecasted residual earnings and book values. The forecast horizon is set to five years.
Beyond this set horizon, forecasted residual earnings grow at the inflation rate and dividend payout is
assumed to be constant at 50%. The valuation equation is specified as follow:

Pt ¼ BVt þ

5
X

τ¼1

aetþτ
aetþ5 ð1 þ gÞ
þ
ð1 þ kCT Þτ ðkCT  gÞð1 þ kCT Þ5

Where aetþτ ¼ ForecastedEPStþτ − kCT BVtþτ−1 with ForecastedEPS is forecasted earnings per share.
BV is book value and BVtþτ ¼ BVtþτ−1 þ ForecastedEPStþτ ð1 − DPRtþτ Þ with DPR is the dividend
payout ratio and equals to 0.5, and g 5 rf - 0.03 with rf is 10 years-Treasury note yield rate obtained in
June of each year. kCT is the cost of equity measured by using Claus and Thomas model.
B.3. Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model – r_OJ
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model is a generalization of the Gordon constant growth model. This
model allows share price to be expressed as the one-year-ahead earnings forecast, the near-term and
perpetual growth forecasts. The forecast horizon is set to one year. After one year, the forecasted
earnings grow at a near-term rate that equals to a perpetual rate. Following Gode and Mohanram’s (2003)
implementation of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model, we compute the cost of equity as follows:

kOJ

sﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
FEPStþ1
þ A þ A2 þ
ðg2  ðγ  1ÞÞ
Pt



− FEPStþ1
tþ1
, DPS tþ1 5 DPS 0 , g2 ¼ STGþLTG
Where A ¼ 12 ðγ − 1Þ þ DPS
, STG ¼ FEPStþ2
, and
Pt0
FEPStþ1
2
ðγ − 1Þ ¼ rf − 0:03 . The near-term growth, g2, is the average of the percentage difference between
two-year-ahead and one-year-ahead earnings forecasts (STG), and the I/B/E/S long-term growth forecast
(LTG). The perpetual growth rate is the expected inflation rate. Dividend per share is assumed to be
constant. The model requires positive one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings forecasts.
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B.4. Easton (2004) model – r_ET
Easton (2004) model is a generalization of the price-earnings growth model and is based on the model of
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). Easton (2004) model allows share price to be expressed as one-yearahead earnings forecasts. The forecast horizon is set to two years. After two years, forecasted abnormal
earnings grow in perpetuity at a constant rate. The model requires positive one-year-ahead and twoyear-ahead earnings forecasts and positive change in earnings forecast. The model is specified as follow:

24

Pt ¼

FEPStþ2 þ kE DPStþ1  FEPStþ1
k2E

Where DPStþ1 5 DPS0.
B.5. Average cost of equity – r_AVG

r AVG ¼ ðr GLS þ r CT þ r OJ þ r ETÞ=4
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